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CONTRACT LAW – Indemnification for Negligence 
Summary 
 An appeal from a district court order granting summary judgment. 
 Disposition/Outcome 
 The Nevada Supreme Court reversed a district court‟s holding which granted summary 
judgment to an insurance company that sought indemnity for its own negligence.  The Court 
remanded the case because the district court needed to determine whether the insurance company 
was negligent before it could enforce the indemnification clause at issue. 
Factual and Procedural History 
 Appellant George L. Brown Insurance Agency, Inc., an independent insurance agency, 
sold insurance policies for Star Insurance Company in exchange for a commission.  The parties 
contract (Producer Agreement) contained an indemnification provision that required Brown to 
indemnify Star for “any and all” losses arising from Brown‟s performance under the contract. 
 James Seeley established and incorporated JBC Drywall, Inc. in California in 1998.  JBC 
employed Oscar Shatswell to transport materials, predominantly in California, with one run per 
week to Las Vegas.  In February 2000, Seeley contacted Brown‟s agent, Terri Alsop, about 
worker‟s compensation for his employees when he began moving JBC‟s operations to Nevada. 
 Alsop advised JBC that his workers‟ compensation insurance would only cover 
employees that lived and worked in Nevada.  Seeley responded his employees would be moving 
to Nevada and employees‟ business trips to California would only be occasional after that.  
Seeley himself moved to Henderson, Nevada in April 2000 and operated JBC from there, but 
JBC remained incorporated in California and continued to employ individuals that worked and 
lived in California, including Shatswell.   
 Alsop completed a workers‟ compensation application for JBC. One portion of the 
application stated that 95% of JBC‟s business was conducted Nevada, and 5% was conducted in 
California.  In August 2000, Alsop secured coverage for JBC through Star Insurance.  Alsop 
informed Seeley that the workers‟ compensation only covered employees that lived in or were 
residents of Nevada.  Alsop also requested an All State Endorsement to cover employees that 
were employed in Nevada but were temporarily working outside Nevada.  The policy went into 
effect on August 2, 2000 and promised coverage in other states.  California was not excluded. 
 Gary Cooper, the underwriter for Star, stated he never saw JBC‟s application.  Cooper 
testified that he understood JBC only did business in Nevada and that he made it very clear to 
Alsop that he “was not interested in writing a California account.”  Alsop, however, testified that 
she advised Cooper about JBC‟s move in May 2000. 
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 Shatswell was injured in California on September 6, 2000, while transporting materials 
for JBC.  Shatswell and JBC filed a claim.  Star denied coverage, stating the policy only covered 
JBC employees and operations in Nevada.  Seeley and JBC sued over the claim in California.   
 An arbitrator with the California Worker‟s Compensation Appeals Board ruled Star‟s 
policy covered Shatwell‟s injury.  The arbitrator reasoned that the policy‟s “Other States 
Coverage” provision applied to worked related injuries in other states and Shatswell was covered 
because California was not among the five states the provision expressly excluded.  The 
arbitrator also ruled Star had knowledge of JBC‟s on-going operations in California based upon 
Alsop‟s knowledge of JBC‟s business and Alsop‟s relationship with Star.  The California Court 
of Appeals upheld the arbitrator‟s decision and Star paid insurance benefits to Shatswell under 
the policy. 
 Star filed a cross-claim for indemnity against Brown and Alsop during the ensuing 
litigation that JBC initiated against both insurance companies.  Star sought:  (1) indemnity from 
Brown and Alsop if it was found liable to JBC; (2) indemnity from Brown and Alsop for funds 
paid to Shatswell; and (3) the fees and costs Star incurred during the litigation JBC and Shatswell 
initiated.  After the district court entered summary judgment for Star based on the 
indemnification clause, Brown and Alsop filed this appeal. 
Discussion 
 On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court agreed with Brown‟s argument that the district 
court erred and summary judgment was not appropriate.  The Court held indemnification only 
applies when the indemnitee is not negligent, unless there is explicit and express contractual 
language to the contrary.  Indemnification clauses containing the language, “for any and all 
liability” do not indemnify against an indemnitee‟s own negligence. 
Standard of Review 
 District court grants of summary judgment are reviewed de novo, without deference to 
the lower court.
2
  Summary judgment is proper when, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
3
  An issue of fact is genuine when the evidence is such 
that a rational jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party.
4
 
Contractual Indemnity Based on the Indemnitee’s Negligence 
 After defining “contractual indemnity” and explaining that its scope is determined by 
contract, the Court stated that whether indemnitors are required to indemnify indemnitees for 
their own negligence was a matter of first impression.  The Court also explained that the district 
court incorrectly applied precedent from the United States District Court for the District of 
Nevada.  In Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. L.K. Comstock & Co., the federal court incorrectly 
assumed Nevada would follow the modern, minority rule that indemnity provisions „for any and 
                                                            
2 Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at Nev. 731, P.3d at 1031. 
all liability‟ would in include all liability, including that arising from indemnitee negligence.5  
The Nevada Supreme Court found the modern rule, and the rationale behind it, were 
unpersuasive.   
 Rather, the Court adopted the traditional, majority rule that an express or explicit 
reference to the indemnitee‟s own negligence is required to indemnify an indemnitee for his or 
her own negligence.  The Court reasoned indemnity for negligence is so unusual and 
extraordinary that express stipulation needs to be required.  The Court also reasoned that the 
majority rule provides clarity and fairness by placing the burden of negligent actions on the party 
at fault,
6
 in accordance with Nevada‟s recognition of the express negligence doctrine, as  
established in Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp.
7
 
Conclusion 
 The indemnification provision in the Producer Agreement did not contain express or 
explicit reference to negligence and was not sufficient to cover Star‟s own negligence.  It was 
improper for the district court to grant summary judgment because it did not establish whether 
Star was negligent before it enforced the indemnification clause.  Genuine issues of material fact 
concerning Star‟s fault must be decided before the indemnification clause can be enforced.  
Summary judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings.  
Concurring Opinion (Pickering, J.) 
 Justice Pickering concurred based upon a different issue of fact.  Under ordinary rules of 
contract construction, it was not clear whether Star issued the insurance policy that Brown 
created as Star‟s agent.  Star and Brown disagreed as to whether Brown exceeded the scope of its 
authority and issued a policy Star would not have approved if Brown had provided complete 
information about JBC‟s business operations.  If Brown exceeded its scope, it may be liable 
under either agency law or the indemnity clause.   
 Justice Pickering stated that Brown did not provide competent proof that Star knew JBC 
was still operating in California when it wrote the policy.  This lack of proof created a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether Star incurred its own liability or whether Brown incurred 
liability that Star could and would have avoided if Brown had provided the information. 
 Furthermore, Star‟s interpretation of the indemnity clause would be unreasonable because 
it established Brown as a reinsurer, not just a producer.  If this extraordinary result was what the 
parties intended, they should have stated such much more clearly than they did. 
 Justice Pickering concluded that summary judgment should be reversed and the case 
should be remanded to decide the issues outlined above. 
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BEFORE HARDESTY, DOUGLAS and PICKERING, JJ. 
  
OPINION 
  
By the Court, DOUGLAS, J.: 
            In this appeal, we consider what approach Nevada should adopt in interpreting indemnity 
provisions in insurance contracts when an indemnitee seeks to be indemnified on claims arising 
out of the indemnitee‟s own negligence.  We conclude that Nevada should adopt the majority 
rule regarding indemnification; therefore, the contract must expressly or explicitly reference the 
indemnitee‟s own negligence before an indemnitee may be indemnified for his or her own 
negligence.  Consequently, we conclude that the district court erred in granting summary 
judgment in favor of respondents Star Insurance Company, Meadowbrook, Inc., and 
Meadowbrook of Nevada, Inc. (collectively, Star), because there are genuine issues of material 
fact concerning fault that must be decided before the indemnification clause at issue here may be 
enforced.[1] 
FACTS 
The parties and their relationship 
            Appellant George L. Brown Insurance Agency, Inc., is an independent insurance agency 
that contracts to sell insurance policies for various insurance carriers, including Star Insurance 
Company.  In exchange for selling Star‟s insurance policies, Brown receives a commission. 
            Brown and Star‟s contract (Producer Agreement) contains an indemnification provision, 
which requires Brown to indemnify Star for losses arising from Brown‟s performance under the 
contract.  The provision states that: 
[Brown] shall defend, indemnify and hold harmless [Star] for any and all damages, losses, 
liabilities, fines, penalties, costs, and all other expenses reasonably incurred by [Star] including 
reasonable attorneys fees, for liabilities imposed upon [Star] in connection with or arising out of 
any claim, suit, hearing, action or proceeding, or threat thereof in which [Star] is involved by 
reason of [Brown] having performed services for [Star] under this Agreement, or having failed to 
perform services required under this Agreement. 
The contract also requires that Brown receive prompt notice of any claim, suit, hearing, action, 
or proceeding to invoke the indemnification provision. 
Disputed insurance policy 
            James Seeley is the sole owner of JBC Drywall, Inc.  In September 1998, Seeley 
incorporated JBC in California, where the company established its principal place of business 
and cities of licensure.  JBC employee Oscar Shatswell resided in La Mirada, California, and was 
employed to transport materials for JBC.  Although Shatswell left his JBC truck in Las Vegas an 
average of one day per week, Shatswell‟s work for JBC was predominately in California. 
            In February 2000, Seeley began moving JBC‟s operations from California to Las Vegas, 
Nevada.  That same month, Seeley contacted Terri Alsop, Brown‟s agent, to obtain workers‟ 
compensation insurance for JBC‟s employees.  However, Alsop advised JBC that his workers‟ 
compensation insurance would only cover employees that lived and worked in Nevada.  Seeley 
informed her that would not be an issue because if he kept any of his California employees, they 
would be moving to Nevada.  He further stated that his employees would only be traveling into 
California occasionally for business. 
            In April 2000, Seeley personally moved to Henderson, Nevada, where he began to 
operate JBC from his home.  Although JBC conducted business in Nevada, it was still 
incorporated in California and continued some of its operations in California.  Additionally, JBC 
continued to employ individuals who lived and worked in California, including Shatswell, who 
remained a resident of California after JBC‟s move.  In May 2000, Alsop completed a workers‟ 
compensation insurance application on behalf of JBC.  Alsop testified that everything she was 
told about JBC‟s operations was contained in the narrative portion of the application.  The 
narrative portion of the application described JBC‟s operations as follows: 
[I]nsured trucks drywall from the Mfg to job sites.  He has employees of the job site who drive 
Grade All and lifts the drywall into the buildings (no more than 2 stories).  He pick ups drywall 
from 3 mfg [sic] in Las Vegas (95% of his business) and one Mfg in La Mirada, California (5% 
one truck once a week).[2] 
            In August 2000, Alsop notified JBC that she had secured insurance in accordance with 
his requests through Star Insurance.  Alsop testified that she informed Seeley both orally and in 
writing that the workers‟ compensation policy would only cover “those of his employees that 
live or are a resident in Nevada.”  In Alsop‟s letter to Seeley, she stated: 
I have secured a quote from Star Insurance Company which is enclosed for your review.  The 
annual premium is $16,897.  This quote is based on three employees at $36,000 each annual 
payroll who are employed and live in Nevada.  I have requested an All State Endorsement be 
added to your policy.  This will cover your employees who are employed in Nevada but are 
temporarily working in another state. 
The policy, which was effective August 2, 2000, included coverage for JBC‟s employees for 
bodily injury by accident and promised coverage in other states; California was not specifically 
excluded. 
            Gary Cooper, senior program director and underwriter of Meadowbrook Insurance 
Company and Star, testified that he never saw JBC‟s application.  However, Alsop testified that 
she advised Cooper in May 2000 that JBC had moved or was moving to Nevada from 
California.  Cooper only remembered Alsop informing him that JBC was no longer in 
California.  Cooper‟s understanding was that JBC was solely a “Nevada risk,” meaning JBC only 
did business in and worked in Nevada.  He further testified that at the time JBC purchased the 
policy, he told Alsop that he “was not interested in writing a California account” and that he 
“made it very clear to [Alsop].”  He explained that Star‟s system only allowed Nevada policies to 
be written because one could only designate Nevada payroll and class codes in the Internet 
system Alsop used to write the policy. 
Accident in California and arbitration 
            On September 6, 2000, while transporting materials in California for JBC, Shatswell was 
injured in an accident.  Shatswell and JBC made a claim under the Star policy.  However, Star 
denied coverage stating that the policy only insured JBC‟s employees and operations in Nevada, 
not in California. 
            In December 2000, Seeley and JBC commenced litigation in California regarding 
Shatswell‟s workers‟ compensation claim.  The California Workers‟ Compensation Board 
referred the issue of insurance coverage to an arbitrator with the California Workers‟ 
Compensation Appeals Board.  The California arbitrator ruled that the policy covered 
Shatswell‟s injury in California.  The arbitrator stated that “the insurance policy which ultimately 
issued to Seeley and JBC does not expressly limit the terms of its coverage to Nevada 
operations.”  This conclusion was predicated on the “Other States Coverage” provision on the 
first page of the policy, which stated that the policy applied to all states except five that were 
expressly listed on the policy.  California was not among the expressly excluded states in the 
policy.  Thus, the arbitrator ruled that JBC is “covered for an injury involving work in „other 
states.‟” 
            Moreover, the arbitrator ruled that Star had “actual and constructive knowledge of the 
fact that [JBC] had an on-going business operation within the State of California.”  The arbitrator 
based this conclusion on Alsop‟s knowledge of JBC‟s business operations in California, which 
the arbitrator appeared to impute to Star based on Star‟s relationship with Alsop.  In fact, the 
arbitrator stated that Alsop was “speaking on behalf of the insurance company.” 
            After the arbitrator‟s ruling, the California Court of Appeals and the California Supreme 
Court upheld the decision, which stated that Star was required under JBC‟s policy to provide 
coverage for Shatswell‟s injuries.  Star is currently paying the insurance benefits to Shatswell 
under the policy. 
Procedural history of this case 
            After the California arbitration, JBC initiated this lawsuit by filing a complaint against 
both Star and Brown in Nevada.[3]  Subsequently, Star filed an amended answer to the 
complaint and filed a cross-claim for indemnity against Brown and Alsop.  Specifically, Star 
sought contractual indemnification for defending this lawsuit against JBC, defending the 
California arbitration against Shatswell‟s claims, and past and future payments made to 
Shatswell under the JBC insurance policy. 
            Star filed a motion for summary judgment against Brown and Alsop on the contractual 
indemnification claims, seeking to recover the payments it made to Shatswell and any other 
liability it has in connection with JBC‟s complaint, by invoking the indemnity provision.  
Specifically, Star sought 
(1) indemnity from Brown and Alsop in the event it is found liable to JBC on the complaint; (2) 
indemnity from Brown and Alsop for all sums which Star has paid or will pay to JBC‟s injured 
employee; and (3) the fees and costs Star has incurred in the various litigation arising from the 
claims of JBC and its employee. 
Based on the indemnification clause, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of 
Star.  Brown and Alsop now appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
            Brown argues that the district court erred when it granted Star‟s motion for summary 
judgment.  Brown contends that the district court erred when it interpreted the indemnification 
provision as requiring Brown to indemnify Star‟s negligence in the absence of express language 
that includes indemnity for the indemnitee‟s own negligence.  We agree.  Where the 
indemnification clause does not specifically and expressly include indemnity for the 
indemnitee‟s own negligence, an indemnification clause “for any and all liability” will not 
indemnify the indemnitee‟s own negligence.  Because we conclude that indemnification only 
applies when the indemnitee is not negligent, in the absence of explicit and express contractual 
language to the contrary, summary judgment was not appropriate in this case. 
Standard of review 
            “This court reviews a district court‟s grant of summary judgment de novo, without 
deference to the findings of the lower court.”  Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 
P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005).  Summary judgment is proper when, viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Id.  An issue of material fact is genuine when 
the evidence is such that a rational jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party.  
Id. at 731, 121 P.3d at 1031. 
Contractual indemnity based on the indemnitee‟s negligence 
            “Contractual indemnity is where, pursuant to a contractual provision, two parties agree 
that one party will reimburse the other party for liability resulting from the former‟s work.”  
Medallion Dev. v. Converse Consultants, 113 Nev. 27, 33, 930 P.2d 115, 119 (1997), superseded 
by statute as stated in Doctors Company v. Vincent, 120 Nev. 644, 654, 98 P.3d 681, 688 
(2004).  The scope of a contractual indemnity clause is determined by the contract and is 
generally interpreted like any contract.  Rossmoor Sanitation, Inc. v. Pylon, Inc., 532 P.2d 97, 
104 (Cal. 1975). 
            An indemnitor‟s contractual obligation to indemnify its indemnitee for the indemnitee‟s 
own negligence is a matter of first impression in Nevada.  The United States District Court for 
the District of Nevada dealt with interpretation of an express contractual indemnity agreement in 
Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. L.K. Comstock & Co., 488 F. Supp. 732 (D. Nev. 1980), rev‟d 
on other grounds, 684 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1982).  The Aetna court, in the absence of controlling 
Nevada precedent, noted that while “[t]he traditional majority position is that strict construction 
should be applied to such indemnity contracts so that express or explicit reference to the 
indemnitee‟s own negligence is required,” id. at 740, the court assumed “that Nevada would 
follow the modern minority rule because it is the more enlightened view.”  Id. at 742.  “The 
modern minority rule is that an indemnity provision „for any and all liability‟ means all liability, 
including that arising from the indemnitee‟s concurrent negligence.”  Id. 
            The rationale behind “the minority view is that such indemnity contracts are so common 
in the modern business world that courts should leave the parties with their bargain for „any and 
all liability.‟”  Id. (citing Martin v. Maintenance Co., Inc., 588 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1978); 
Jacksonville Terminal Co. v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 296 F.2d 256, 262 (5th Cir. 1961)).  
Applying the minority rule, the Aetna court held that the fact that the indemnitee was 
concurrently negligent was immaterial, and the indemnitor was bound by its contract to 
indemnify the indemnitee in full.  Id. at 742.  We find this rationale unpersuasive. 
            In this case, it appears the district court applied the minority view in granting summary 
judgment in favor of Star in finding that the indemnification provision of the Producer 
Agreement was “clear and unambiguous . . . [and] entitled to be enforced by the court.” 
            We reject the rationale of the so-called minority rule because a general clause is not 
sufficient to impose such an extraordinary remedy.  Instead, we adopt the majority rule—an 
express or explicit reference to the indemnitee‟s own negligence is required to indemnify an 
indemnitee for his or her own negligence—because “the character of [such an] indemnity [is] so 
unusual and extraordinary, that there can be no presumption that the indemnitor intended to 
assume the responsibility unless the contract puts it beyond doubt by express stipulation, and no 
inference from words of general import can establish it.”  41 Am. Jur. 2d Indemnity § 16 (2005). 
             Consistent with the majority rule, “contracts purporting to indemnify a party against its 
own negligence will only be enforced if they clearly express such an intent and a general 
provision indemnifying the indemnitee „against any and all claims,‟ standing alone, is not 
sufficient.”  Camp, Dresser & McKee v. Paul N. Howard, 853 So. 2d 1072, 1077 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2003) (internal citations omitted); see also 41 Am. Jur. 2d Indemnity § 18 (2005).  “[A] 
contract of indemnity will not be construed to indemnify a party against loss or damage resulting 
from its own negligent acts unless such intention is expressed in clear and unequivocal terms.”  
Economy Forms v. J.S. Alberici Constr., 53 S.W.3d 552, 554 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).  Unlike the 
modern minority rule, the majority rule provides clarity and fairness to the parties involved.  
Under the majority rule, the wrongdoer faces the consequences of his or her actions rather than 
“cast[ing] the burden of negligent actions upon those who were not actually at fault.”  United 
States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 212 (1970).  Thus, the modern minority rule allows for too 
much to be read into the terms of a contract that the parties may not have intended and could 
substantially benefit one party to the extreme detriment of the other. 
            Adopting the majority rule is also consistent with our recognition of the express 
negligence doctrine, which “provides that a party demanding indemnity from the consequences 
of its own negligence must express that intent in specific terms.”  Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 76 
S.W.3d 555, 559-60 (Tex. App. 2002).  “[T]he purpose of the express negligence doctrine [is] to 
prevent surprise to the indemnitor.”  Id. at 560.  “Under the doctrine of express negligence, the 
intent of the parties must be specifically stated within the four corners of the contract.”  Id.  
Further, indemnification “provisions are strictly construed and will not be held to provide 
indemnification unless it is so stated in clear and unequivocal terms.”  GKN Co. v. Starnes 
Trucking, Inc., 798 N.E.2d 548, 552 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (“[W]e are mindful that to obligate one 
party for the negligence of another is a harsh burden that a party would not lightly accept.”). 
            The indemnification provision of the Producer Agreement states, “[Brown] shall defend, 
indemnify and hold harmless [Star] for any and all damages, losses, liabilities, fines, penalties, 
costs, and all other expenses reasonably incurred by [Star] . . . .”  There is no express or explicit 
reference to negligence and this general provision is not sufficient to indemnify Star against its 
own (possible) negligence.  Because the indemnification clause does not cover Star‟s own 
negligence, the district court‟s grant of summary judgment is improper because it must first be 
determined whether Star was negligent before enforcement of the indemnification clause is 
appropriate. 
            Here, the district court did not make a finding of negligence, instead stating “[t]hat, as a 
matter of law, Star is not required to prove, as part of its prima facie claim for contractual 
indemnity, that it was not negligent” and “[t]hat the issue of negligence is speculative.”  We 
disagree and conclude that the district court must make a finding of whether Star was negligent 
before it can determine the applicability of the indemnification clause.  Therefore, summary 
judgment was not appropriate in this case, as genuine issues of material fact remain concerning 
Star‟s fault that must be decided before the indemnification clause at issue here may be enforced. 
            Accordingly, we reverse the district court‟s grant of summary judgment and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
  
HARDESTY, J. concurs. 
  
**********FOOTNOTES********** 
[1]        We do not reach the other issues appellants raise as they are resolved by our reversal and 
remand. 
[2]        We understand “Mfg” to mean manufacturer or manufacturing site. 
[3]        After prevailing on their workers‟ compensation claim in California, Seeley and JBC 
brought claims against Brown and Alsop for professional negligence and against Star for breach 
of insurance contract, breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of statutory 
duties.  Seeley and JBC‟s claims were dismissed on various motions unrelated to the issues in 
this appeal in February 2005, and only the claims between Brown, Alsop, and Star remain. 
***************************** 
PICKERING, J., concurring: 
            While I concur in the decision to reverse summary judgment and remand for further 
proceedings in this case, I do so because I find an issue of fact as to whether Star issued the 
problematic insurance policy “by reason of [Brown] having performed services for [Star] under 
this Agreement,” as the indemnity clause in the Producer Agreement requires.  This conclusion 
depends on reading the indemnity clause as applying only when Brown‟s acts or omissions 
caused Star to incur liability it could not avoid and would not have incurred otherwise.  I read the 
clause this way not because Star seeks indemnity for negligence—I don‟t see that it does—but 
based on ordinary rules of contract construction. 
            As noted, I do not see this case as involving a question of indemnity for negligence.  The 
party seeking indemnification, Star, was held contractually liable on a policy of insurance that 
Brown, acting as Star‟s producing agent, originated.  Star now seeks contractual indemnity from 
Brown.  There is no claim that Star was negligent toward the insured or toward Brown; hence, 
there is no question of Star being indemnified by Brown for Star‟s negligence.  At most, Star 
seeks indemnity for having issued a policy it wouldn‟t have if Brown had provided complete 
information about the prospective insured‟s business on the application Brown forwarded.  
Brown and Star disagree on whether Star knew what Brown knew (or should have known) about 
the insured when Star issued the policy. 
            The Producer Agreement defined the insurance risks Star authorized Brown to solicit and 
submit.  If Brown exceeded the scope of its authority in taking this partly California-based 
insured‟s application and forwarding it to Star as unexceptionable, then Brown may be liable to 
Star as a matter of agency law, Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.09 cmt. b, illus. 1 (2006), 
and/or under the indemnity clause in the Producer Agreement (Star having become “involved” in 
a “claim, suit, hearing, action or proceeding” giving rise to “liabilit[y]” “by reason of [Brown] 
having performed services for [Star] under this Agreement”).  However, Brown opposed 
summary judgment with competent proof that Star knew that the insured still had operations in 
California when it accepted the application and issued the policy—in other words, that Star knew 
what Brown knew about the applicant and chose to write the policy anyway.  This was sufficient 
to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Star incurred contractual liability to the 
insured on its own and not “by reason of” Brown.  See id. cmt. b (an agent‟s liability to a 
principal for unauthorized actions “does not extend to loss that the principal could have 
avoided”).  Star‟s different interpretation of the indemnity clause would lead to Brown being a 
reinsurer, not simply a producer, which is an unreasonable reading of the Producer Agreement as 
a whole.  See 5 Margaret N. Kniffin, Corbin on Contracts § 24.22, at 240 (1998) (noting 
“preference for an interpretation that will result in contract terms that are reasonable”).  Using 
the fault-based rubric the parties persuade the majority to adopt, if this commercially 
extraordinary result was what the parties intended, they should have said so much more clearly 
than they did.  Cf. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 22 cmt. f (2000) 
(“An indemnitee can recover contractual indemnity for his or her own legally culpable conduct 
only if the contract is clear on that point,” but noting that, “[i]f the contract is otherwise clear, it 
need not contain specific words, such as „negligence‟ or „fault.‟”). 
            I thus concur in my colleagues‟ decision to reverse summary judgment and remand but 
for the reasons and on the limited issues outlined above. 
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OPINION 
  
By the Court, DOUGLAS, J.: 
            In this appeal, we consider what approach Nevada should adopt in interpreting indemnity 
provisions in insurance contracts when an indemnitee seeks to be indemnified on claims arising 
out of the indemnitee‟s own negligence.  We conclude that Nevada should adopt the majority 
rule regarding indemnification; therefore, the contract must expressly or explicitly reference the 
indemnitee‟s own negligence before an indemnitee may be indemnified for his or her own 
negligence.  Consequently, we conclude that the district court erred in granting summary 
judgment in favor of respondents Star Insurance Company, Meadowbrook, Inc., and 
Meadowbrook of Nevada, Inc. (collectively, Star), because there are genuine issues of material 
fact concerning fault that must be decided before the indemnification clause at issue here may be 
enforced.[1] 
FACTS 
The parties and their relationship 
            Appellant George L. Brown Insurance Agency, Inc., is an independent insurance agency 
that contracts to sell insurance policies for various insurance carriers, including Star Insurance 
Company.  In exchange for selling Star‟s insurance policies, Brown receives a commission. 
            Brown and Star‟s contract (Producer Agreement) contains an indemnification provision, 
which requires Brown to indemnify Star for losses arising from Brown‟s performance under the 
contract.  The provision states that: 
[Brown] shall defend, indemnify and hold harmless [Star] for any and all damages, losses, 
liabilities, fines, penalties, costs, and all other expenses reasonably incurred by [Star] including 
reasonable attorneys fees, for liabilities imposed upon [Star] in connection with or arising out of 
any claim, suit, hearing, action or proceeding, or threat thereof in which [Star] is involved by 
reason of [Brown] having performed services for [Star] under this Agreement, or having failed to 
perform services required under this Agreement. 
The contract also requires that Brown receive prompt notice of any claim, suit, hearing, action, 
or proceeding to invoke the indemnification provision. 
Disputed insurance policy 
            James Seeley is the sole owner of JBC Drywall, Inc.  In September 1998, Seeley 
incorporated JBC in California, where the company established its principal place of business 
and cities of licensure.  JBC employee Oscar Shatswell resided in La Mirada, California, and was 
employed to transport materials for JBC.  Although Shatswell left his JBC truck in Las Vegas an 
average of one day per week, Shatswell‟s work for JBC was predominately in California. 
            In February 2000, Seeley began moving JBC‟s operations from California to Las Vegas, 
Nevada.  That same month, Seeley contacted Terri Alsop, Brown‟s agent, to obtain workers‟ 
compensation insurance for JBC‟s employees.  However, Alsop advised JBC that his workers‟ 
compensation insurance would only cover employees that lived and worked in Nevada.  Seeley 
informed her that would not be an issue because if he kept any of his California employees, they 
would be moving to Nevada.  He further stated that his employees would only be traveling into 
California occasionally for business. 
            In April 2000, Seeley personally moved to Henderson, Nevada, where he began to 
operate JBC from his home.  Although JBC conducted business in Nevada, it was still 
incorporated in California and continued some of its operations in California.  Additionally, JBC 
continued to employ individuals who lived and worked in California, including Shatswell, who 
remained a resident of California after JBC‟s move.  In May 2000, Alsop completed a workers‟ 
compensation insurance application on behalf of JBC.  Alsop testified that everything she was 
told about JBC‟s operations was contained in the narrative portion of the application.  The 
narrative portion of the application described JBC‟s operations as follows: 
[I]nsured trucks drywall from the Mfg to job sites.  He has employees of the job site who drive 
Grade All and lifts the drywall into the buildings (no more than 2 stories).  He pick ups drywall 
from 3 mfg [sic] in Las Vegas (95% of his business) and one Mfg in La Mirada, California (5% 
one truck once a week).[2] 
            In August 2000, Alsop notified JBC that she had secured insurance in accordance with 
his requests through Star Insurance.  Alsop testified that she informed Seeley both orally and in 
writing that the workers‟ compensation policy would only cover “those of his employees that 
live or are a resident in Nevada.”  In Alsop‟s letter to Seeley, she stated: 
I have secured a quote from Star Insurance Company which is enclosed for your review.  The 
annual premium is $16,897.  This quote is based on three employees at $36,000 each annual 
payroll who are employed and live in Nevada.  I have requested an All State Endorsement be 
added to your policy.  This will cover your employees who are employed in Nevada but are 
temporarily working in another state. 
The policy, which was effective August 2, 2000, included coverage for JBC‟s employees for 
bodily injury by accident and promised coverage in other states; California was not specifically 
excluded. 
            Gary Cooper, senior program director and underwriter of Meadowbrook Insurance 
Company and Star, testified that he never saw JBC‟s application.  However, Alsop testified that 
she advised Cooper in May 2000 that JBC had moved or was moving to Nevada from 
California.  Cooper only remembered Alsop informing him that JBC was no longer in 
California.  Cooper‟s understanding was that JBC was solely a “Nevada risk,” meaning JBC only 
did business in and worked in Nevada.  He further testified that at the time JBC purchased the 
policy, he told Alsop that he “was not interested in writing a California account” and that he 
“made it very clear to [Alsop].”  He explained that Star‟s system only allowed Nevada policies to 
be written because one could only designate Nevada payroll and class codes in the Internet 
system Alsop used to write the policy. 
Accident in California and arbitration 
            On September 6, 2000, while transporting materials in California for JBC, Shatswell was 
injured in an accident.  Shatswell and JBC made a claim under the Star policy.  However, Star 
denied coverage stating that the policy only insured JBC‟s employees and operations in Nevada, 
not in California. 
            In December 2000, Seeley and JBC commenced litigation in California regarding 
Shatswell‟s workers‟ compensation claim.  The California Workers‟ Compensation Board 
referred the issue of insurance coverage to an arbitrator with the California Workers‟ 
Compensation Appeals Board.  The California arbitrator ruled that the policy covered 
Shatswell‟s injury in California.  The arbitrator stated that “the insurance policy which ultimately 
issued to Seeley and JBC does not expressly limit the terms of its coverage to Nevada 
operations.”  This conclusion was predicated on the “Other States Coverage” provision on the 
first page of the policy, which stated that the policy applied to all states except five that were 
expressly listed on the policy.  California was not among the expressly excluded states in the 
policy.  Thus, the arbitrator ruled that JBC is “covered for an injury involving work in „other 
states.‟” 
            Moreover, the arbitrator ruled that Star had “actual and constructive knowledge of the 
fact that [JBC] had an on-going business operation within the State of California.”  The arbitrator 
based this conclusion on Alsop‟s knowledge of JBC‟s business operations in California, which 
the arbitrator appeared to impute to Star based on Star‟s relationship with Alsop.  In fact, the 
arbitrator stated that Alsop was “speaking on behalf of the insurance company.” 
            After the arbitrator‟s ruling, the California Court of Appeals and the California Supreme 
Court upheld the decision, which stated that Star was required under JBC‟s policy to provide 
coverage for Shatswell‟s injuries.  Star is currently paying the insurance benefits to Shatswell 
under the policy. 
Procedural history of this case 
            After the California arbitration, JBC initiated this lawsuit by filing a complaint against 
both Star and Brown in Nevada.[3]  Subsequently, Star filed an amended answer to the 
complaint and filed a cross-claim for indemnity against Brown and Alsop.  Specifically, Star 
sought contractual indemnification for defending this lawsuit against JBC, defending the 
California arbitration against Shatswell‟s claims, and past and future payments made to 
Shatswell under the JBC insurance policy. 
            Star filed a motion for summary judgment against Brown and Alsop on the contractual 
indemnification claims, seeking to recover the payments it made to Shatswell and any other 
liability it has in connection with JBC‟s complaint, by invoking the indemnity provision.  
Specifically, Star sought 
(1) indemnity from Brown and Alsop in the event it is found liable to JBC on the complaint; (2) 
indemnity from Brown and Alsop for all sums which Star has paid or will pay to JBC‟s injured 
employee; and (3) the fees and costs Star has incurred in the various litigation arising from the 
claims of JBC and its employee. 
Based on the indemnification clause, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of 
Star.  Brown and Alsop now appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
            Brown argues that the district court erred when it granted Star‟s motion for summary 
judgment.  Brown contends that the district court erred when it interpreted the indemnification 
provision as requiring Brown to indemnify Star‟s negligence in the absence of express language 
that includes indemnity for the indemnitee‟s own negligence.  We agree.  Where the 
indemnification clause does not specifically and expressly include indemnity for the 
indemnitee‟s own negligence, an indemnification clause “for any and all liability” will not 
indemnify the indemnitee‟s own negligence.  Because we conclude that indemnification only 
applies when the indemnitee is not negligent, in the absence of explicit and express contractual 
language to the contrary, summary judgment was not appropriate in this case. 
Standard of review 
            “This court reviews a district court‟s grant of summary judgment de novo, without 
deference to the findings of the lower court.”  Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 
P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005).  Summary judgment is proper when, viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Id.  An issue of material fact is genuine when 
the evidence is such that a rational jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party.  
Id. at 731, 121 P.3d at 1031. 
Contractual indemnity based on the indemnitee‟s negligence 
            “Contractual indemnity is where, pursuant to a contractual provision, two parties agree 
that one party will reimburse the other party for liability resulting from the former‟s work.”  
Medallion Dev. v. Converse Consultants, 113 Nev. 27, 33, 930 P.2d 115, 119 (1997), superseded 
by statute as stated in Doctors Company v. Vincent, 120 Nev. 644, 654, 98 P.3d 681, 688 
(2004).  The scope of a contractual indemnity clause is determined by the contract and is 
generally interpreted like any contract.  Rossmoor Sanitation, Inc. v. Pylon, Inc., 532 P.2d 97, 
104 (Cal. 1975). 
            An indemnitor‟s contractual obligation to indemnify its indemnitee for the indemnitee‟s 
own negligence is a matter of first impression in Nevada.  The United States District Court for 
the District of Nevada dealt with interpretation of an express contractual indemnity agreement in 
Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. L.K. Comstock & Co., 488 F. Supp. 732 (D. Nev. 1980), rev‟d 
on other grounds, 684 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1982).  The Aetna court, in the absence of controlling 
Nevada precedent, noted that while “[t]he traditional majority position is that strict construction 
should be applied to such indemnity contracts so that express or explicit reference to the 
indemnitee‟s own negligence is required,” id. at 740, the court assumed “that Nevada would 
follow the modern minority rule because it is the more enlightened view.”  Id. at 742.  “The 
modern minority rule is that an indemnity provision „for any and all liability‟ means all liability, 
including that arising from the indemnitee‟s concurrent negligence.”  Id. 
            The rationale behind “the minority view is that such indemnity contracts are so common 
in the modern business world that courts should leave the parties with their bargain for „any and 
all liability.‟”  Id. (citing Martin v. Maintenance Co., Inc., 588 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1978); 
Jacksonville Terminal Co. v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 296 F.2d 256, 262 (5th Cir. 1961)).  
Applying the minority rule, the Aetna court held that the fact that the indemnitee was 
concurrently negligent was immaterial, and the indemnitor was bound by its contract to 
indemnify the indemnitee in full.  Id. at 742.  We find this rationale unpersuasive. 
            In this case, it appears the district court applied the minority view in granting summary 
judgment in favor of Star in finding that the indemnification provision of the Producer 
Agreement was “clear and unambiguous . . . [and] entitled to be enforced by the court.” 
            We reject the rationale of the so-called minority rule because a general clause is not 
sufficient to impose such an extraordinary remedy.  Instead, we adopt the majority rule—an 
express or explicit reference to the indemnitee‟s own negligence is required to indemnify an 
indemnitee for his or her own negligence—because “the character of [such an] indemnity [is] so 
unusual and extraordinary, that there can be no presumption that the indemnitor intended to 
assume the responsibility unless the contract puts it beyond doubt by express stipulation, and no 
inference from words of general import can establish it.”  41 Am. Jur. 2d Indemnity § 16 (2005). 
             Consistent with the majority rule, “contracts purporting to indemnify a party against its 
own negligence will only be enforced if they clearly express such an intent and a general 
provision indemnifying the indemnitee „against any and all claims,‟ standing alone, is not 
sufficient.”  Camp, Dresser & McKee v. Paul N. Howard, 853 So. 2d 1072, 1077 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2003) (internal citations omitted); see also 41 Am. Jur. 2d Indemnity § 18 (2005).  “[A] 
contract of indemnity will not be construed to indemnify a party against loss or damage resulting 
from its own negligent acts unless such intention is expressed in clear and unequivocal terms.”  
Economy Forms v. J.S. Alberici Constr., 53 S.W.3d 552, 554 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).  Unlike the 
modern minority rule, the majority rule provides clarity and fairness to the parties involved.  
Under the majority rule, the wrongdoer faces the consequences of his or her actions rather than 
“cast[ing] the burden of negligent actions upon those who were not actually at fault.”  United 
States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 212 (1970).  Thus, the modern minority rule allows for too 
much to be read into the terms of a contract that the parties may not have intended and could 
substantially benefit one party to the extreme detriment of the other. 
            Adopting the majority rule is also consistent with our recognition of the express 
negligence doctrine, which “provides that a party demanding indemnity from the consequences 
of its own negligence must express that intent in specific terms.”  Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 76 
S.W.3d 555, 559-60 (Tex. App. 2002).  “[T]he purpose of the express negligence doctrine [is] to 
prevent surprise to the indemnitor.”  Id. at 560.  “Under the doctrine of express negligence, the 
intent of the parties must be specifically stated within the four corners of the contract.”  Id.  
Further, indemnification “provisions are strictly construed and will not be held to provide 
indemnification unless it is so stated in clear and unequivocal terms.”  GKN Co. v. Starnes 
Trucking, Inc., 798 N.E.2d 548, 552 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (“[W]e are mindful that to obligate one 
party for the negligence of another is a harsh burden that a party would not lightly accept.”). 
            The indemnification provision of the Producer Agreement states, “[Brown] shall defend, 
indemnify and hold harmless [Star] for any and all damages, losses, liabilities, fines, penalties, 
costs, and all other expenses reasonably incurred by [Star] . . . .”  There is no express or explicit 
reference to negligence and this general provision is not sufficient to indemnify Star against its 
own (possible) negligence.  Because the indemnification clause does not cover Star‟s own 
negligence, the district court‟s grant of summary judgment is improper because it must first be 
determined whether Star was negligent before enforcement of the indemnification clause is 
appropriate. 
            Here, the district court did not make a finding of negligence, instead stating “[t]hat, as a 
matter of law, Star is not required to prove, as part of its prima facie claim for contractual 
indemnity, that it was not negligent” and “[t]hat the issue of negligence is speculative.”  We 
disagree and conclude that the district court must make a finding of whether Star was negligent 
before it can determine the applicability of the indemnification clause.  Therefore, summary 
judgment was not appropriate in this case, as genuine issues of material fact remain concerning 
Star‟s fault that must be decided before the indemnification clause at issue here may be enforced. 
            Accordingly, we reverse the district court‟s grant of summary judgment and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
  
HARDESTY, J. concurs. 
  
**********FOOTNOTES********** 
[1]        We do not reach the other issues appellants raise as they are resolved by our reversal and 
remand. 
[2]        We understand “Mfg” to mean manufacturer or manufacturing site. 
[3]        After prevailing on their workers‟ compensation claim in California, Seeley and JBC 
brought claims against Brown and Alsop for professional negligence and against Star for breach 
of insurance contract, breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of statutory 
duties.  Seeley and JBC‟s claims were dismissed on various motions unrelated to the issues in 
this appeal in February 2005, and only the claims between Brown, Alsop, and Star remain. 
***************************** 
PICKERING, J., concurring: 
            While I concur in the decision to reverse summary judgment and remand for further 
proceedings in this case, I do so because I find an issue of fact as to whether Star issued the 
problematic insurance policy “by reason of [Brown] having performed services for [Star] under 
this Agreement,” as the indemnity clause in the Producer Agreement requires.  This conclusion 
depends on reading the indemnity clause as applying only when Brown‟s acts or omissions 
caused Star to incur liability it could not avoid and would not have incurred otherwise.  I read the 
clause this way not because Star seeks indemnity for negligence—I don‟t see that it does—but 
based on ordinary rules of contract construction. 
            As noted, I do not see this case as involving a question of indemnity for negligence.  The 
party seeking indemnification, Star, was held contractually liable on a policy of insurance that 
Brown, acting as Star‟s producing agent, originated.  Star now seeks contractual indemnity from 
Brown.  There is no claim that Star was negligent toward the insured or toward Brown; hence, 
there is no question of Star being indemnified by Brown for Star‟s negligence.  At most, Star 
seeks indemnity for having issued a policy it wouldn‟t have if Brown had provided complete 
information about the prospective insured‟s business on the application Brown forwarded.  
Brown and Star disagree on whether Star knew what Brown knew (or should have known) about 
the insured when Star issued the policy. 
            The Producer Agreement defined the insurance risks Star authorized Brown to solicit and 
submit.  If Brown exceeded the scope of its authority in taking this partly California-based 
insured‟s application and forwarding it to Star as unexceptionable, then Brown may be liable to 
Star as a matter of agency law, Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.09 cmt. b, illus. 1 (2006), 
and/or under the indemnity clause in the Producer Agreement (Star having become “involved” in 
a “claim, suit, hearing, action or proceeding” giving rise to “liabilit[y]” “by reason of [Brown] 
having performed services for [Star] under this Agreement”).  However, Brown opposed 
summary judgment with competent proof that Star knew that the insured still had operations in 
California when it accepted the application and issued the policy—in other words, that Star knew 
what Brown knew about the applicant and chose to write the policy anyway.  This was sufficient 
to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Star incurred contractual liability to the 
insured on its own and not “by reason of” Brown.  See id. cmt. b (an agent‟s liability to a 
principal for unauthorized actions “does not extend to loss that the principal could have 
avoided”).  Star‟s different interpretation of the indemnity clause would lead to Brown being a 
reinsurer, not simply a producer, which is an unreasonable reading of the Producer Agreement as 
a whole.  See 5 Margaret N. Kniffin, Corbin on Contracts § 24.22, at 240 (1998) (noting 
“preference for an interpretation that will result in contract terms that are reasonable”).  Using 
the fault-based rubric the parties persuade the majority to adopt, if this commercially 
extraordinary result was what the parties intended, they should have said so much more clearly 
than they did.  Cf. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 22 cmt. f (2000) 
(“An indemnitee can recover contractual indemnity for his or her own legally culpable conduct 
only if the contract is clear on that point,” but noting that, “[i]f the contract is otherwise clear, it 
need not contain specific words, such as „negligence‟ or „fault.‟”). 
            I thus concur in my colleagues‟ decision to reverse summary judgment and remand but 
for the reasons and on the limited issues outlined above. 
  
 
